New Jersey Employment Law Blog

Today brings news of two developments featuring coaches of women's sports teams.  The first comes from California.  USA Today reports that the former coach of the Fresno State women's basketball team  has won a jury verdict of more than $19 million.  She claims that she was fired for promoting women's issues.  The university, her former employer takes a different view, claiming inappropriate conduct on the job and obtaining a prescription pain-killer from one of her players.

Local reports from the Newark Star-Ledger bring news of the criminal conviction of a former Immaculata High School girls basketball coach as a result of having what apparently was a "consensual" sexual relationship with a player.  Patricia Balogh was convicted on four of five counts, although she avoided the most serious, which charged aggravated first degree sexual assault.  A conviction on that charge could have landed her in prison for 40 years.  As it is, she's looking at 10.  There's no word whether the victim's family plans to pursue an action for civil relief against the coach or the school.

Educational employers must be vigilant.  Inappropriate relationships between players and coaches are not common, but neither are they rare.  When they occur they have the potential to cause significant liabilities and, just as important, reputational damage. 

Posted In Employment Law News , Gender Discrimination & Sexual Harassment , Sexual Harassment | Comments (0) | Permalink |

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently found a Jewish Community Center to be a "religious organization" that was "exempted from compliance with the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII by Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."  The case is Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Association.  The issue of the status of the Lancaster Jewish Community Center arose in an employment discrimination lawsuit, brought by one of its employees, a Christian, who claimed that she was fired for her non-Jewish religious beliefs. 

The 3rd Circuit majority found that LJCC was an exempt religious organization, which required the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.  Judge Rendell, however, filed a cogent dissent concluding that the majority completely misread the intent of Congress.  Her analysis of the structure and funding mechanism of the LJCC suggests that it is not a "religious organization" within the meaning of the statute.  If she is right --- and at first glance it seems that there's a good chance she is --- this case may find its way to next year's Supreme Court docket.

For now, the practical effect of the Leboon case is a warning that religious organizations and their affiliates should seek counsel before hiring or firing employees of other faiths.

Posted In Religious Discrimination | Comments (0) | Permalink |

The LA Times reports that the House of Representatives has passed a bill that would reverse the decision of the US Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear, which strictly construed Title VII's 180 day requirement for filing of pay discrimination claims.  We previously posted on this decision here, wondering whether Congress would make good on its threat to overturn the decision through legislation.  The House bill, if passed by the Senate and signed into law, would return the law to where it stood before the Supreme Court ruled. 

Curiously, according to the report the veto-averse White House has threatened to veto this bill if it is passed by the Senate.  The government has no direct stake in the litigation, and the bill would merely restore the status quo.  What is it about this situation that would cause the White House to threaten the ultimate sanction of a veto?

Posted In Employment Law News , Title VII | Comments (0) | Permalink |

The Baltimore Sun reports that NJ-based supermarket chain A&P has been found liable for unlawfully discriminating against a white employee, or so-called "reverse discrimination."  The plaintiff, John Sullivan, claimed that he was demoted and replaced by a black employee on the basis of race discrimination.  A federal jury agreed.  Post-trial motions that will determine the amount of compensation that will be awarded to Sullivan are pending.

According to the EEOC, about 10% of the race discrimination complaints that it receives are from whites.  It is unusual, however, for a white plaintiff to succeed in such a claim.

Posted In Title VII | Comments (0) | Permalink |

Here's more from the NY Times on the potential ramifications of Ledbetter v. Goodyear, the Supreme Court pay discrimination case, on which we posted yesterday.

Posted In Title VII | Comments (0) | Permalink |

Today, in a 5-4 decision, with the majority opinion by Justice Samuel Alito (NJ born and bred) and  a dissent authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (NJ's via a professorship at Rutgers Law School), the United States Supreme Court decided an important issue of procedure dealing with EEOC filing requirements in Title VII cases.  We've posted previously on Ledbetter v. Goodyear.

Here's the SCOTUS opinion.

Long story made short, the plaintiff sued her employer for alleged sexual discrimination under Title VII.  Her main argument was that over time she was paid significantly less than similarly situated male workers.  Goodyear made pay decisions based upon performance evaluations. Ledbetter claimed that she received unfavorable evaluations because of her gender, that she was therefore paid less than the men, and that these decisions carried forward through the years so that, by the time she retired, she was significantly underpaid.  The trial court jury agreed and awarded her damages.  The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

In a rather technical interpretation of Title VII, the Supreme Court agreed that she was not entitled to recover.  It held that she had not met the requirement of the law that she file a timely claim with the EEOC for each discrete act of discrimination. 

The practical import of the decision for employees: file your claims of intentional discrimination on time or be forever barred from pursuing them.  That, according to the majority, is what Congress intended. 

The four dissenting justices thought that pay cases are different from other kinds of Title VII cases (such as failure to hire) and deserve different and more flexible treatment.

Under federal law the issue is now decided: pay-based claims of discrimination under Title VII must comply strictly with Title VII's filing requirements.  But does this tell the whole story for NJ employers and employees?  Probably not.  The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination contains the same prohibition against gender-based discrimination as does Title VII, but has no requirement that claims first be filed with an administrative agency.  Therefore, the logic of Ledbetter v. Goodyear should not bar such claims under NJ state law.  Looked at differently, if Ms. Ledbetter had filed the same complaint in New Jersey and pursued it in the same way, she probably would have won.

Thus, NJ employers cannot take too much comfort from the Ledbetter decision.  NJ employees likely still have an option open.

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The New Jersey courts recently revisited the question whether offensive language in the workplace violates the Law Against Discrimination.  In Taylor v. Metzger, the best-known example of such conduct, the Supreme Court held that a single instance of referring to an African-American worker as a "jungle bunny" created a hostile work environment. 

Now, in Cutler v. Dorn,  the Appellate Division has held that referring to a co-worker as "a dirty Jew" does not rise to the same level of severity as the "jungle bunny" comment, and does not necessarily give rise to a claim under the LAD.  The court's opinion, however, makes clear that the context in which the comment was made was critical to its decision.

The Haddonfield Police Department is relatively small and had been populated by an "in-group" of officers and some supervisors who delighted in playing pranks, teasing, ribbing and "breaking each others chops." Plaintiff participated to at least some extent. Humor files, containing offensive material, were well known and made available for perusal for those who wished to indulge, including plaintiff.

Against this backdrop, Shreve, a co-worker whom plaintiff did not particularly like, made the "dirty Jews" comment in plaintiff's presence. While the comment was undoubtedly disturbing, it was isolated, not specifically directed at plaintiff, and not made by a supervisor.

The plaintiff received a scheduled promotion and did not otherwise suffer any adverse employment action.

In considering all of the circumstances, the court held that "the comments and pranks were sporadic and not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment under the LAD."  In fact, even though the jury had found for the plaintiff at trial, the court held that the trial judge should have granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.

Employers should be wary about this holding.  It certainly does not give carte blanche permission to use derogatory language in the workplace.  All complaints received from employees about offensive conduct should continue to be taken seriously and investigated promptly.  The Cutler opinion notwithstanding, doing anything less is playing with fire.

Posted In Religious Discrimination | Comments (0) | Permalink |

Yahoo reports today that the Supreme Court has heard oral argument in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.   The case raises a technical but important issue about the period of time for which a Title VII plaintiff can recover back pay.  The issue involves the application of the 180 day time limit for complaining about discriminatory employment practices.

After 19 years at a Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. plant in Gadsden, Ala., Lilly Ledbetter was making $6,000 a year less than the lowest-paid man in the same job.

She filed a pay discrimination lawsuit in 1999, arguing the disparity existed for years and was primarily a result of her gender. A federal jury agreed and awarded Ledbetter more than $3.8 million. A judge reduced the award to $360,000.

Goodyear appealed and the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's award, holding that her time to complain had passed long ago.

Ledbetter then appealed to the Supreme Court.  She contends that each new paycheck that she receives continues the discrimination that started when she was first employed and is a new violation of her civil rights.

This is a case that contains both a serious legal issue and significant practical ramifications for business if Ledbetter wins.  It bears careful watching, and watch it we will.  A decision is expected in the summer. 

Posted In Employment Law News , Title VII | Comments (0) | Permalink |

The EEOC has filed suit against Land O'Lakes, the dairy cooperative. The case stems from LOL's practice of requiring its departing employees, in their separation agreements, to promise not to file a discrimination complaint with the EEOC. According to the separation agreement, if the employee filed a complaint, severance benefits would be forfeited.

The suit claims that the practice violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act.

The case could be important since many --- perhaps most --- separation agreements contain similar language.

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Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White has become this Supreme Court term's most important employment law decision. It has already drawn considerable comment from the legal blogosphere's early responders, nicely collected by Carolyn Elefant here.

The question that was decided by the court was one that had separated the federal courts of appeals into three camps: what a plaintiff must prove to establish that she was the victim of unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The specific issues were whether Burlington's actions in (1) changing White's job function and (2) suspending her without pay for 37 days, constituted an unlawful retaliation. The trial court jury held for White and awarded her damages. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and found for Burlington Northern.

The Supreme Court sided with the jury.

The Court considered the difference between a substantive claim of discrimination and a related claim of retaliation.

The anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees. The substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.

But one cannot secure the second objective by focusing only upon employer actions and harm that concern employment and the workplace. Were all such actions and harms eliminated, the anti-retaliation provision's objective would not be achieved. An employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.

Thus, purpose reinforces what language already indicates, namely, that the anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.

The Court took pains to note that the employee who alleges retaliation must suffer an injury or harm. The standard for determining harm is objective (not subjective to the complaining employee):

In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.

Over time the lower courts will sort out what this standard means in practical application. We'll revisit the retaliation issue over time as the courts put some meat on the bones of this newly clarified standard.

Posted In Title VII | Comments (0) | Permalink |

This is our second post in a row that examines a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit --- this time arising out of a case from Iowa --- involving explicitly sexual conduct in the workplace. The case is Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co,, decided April 28, 2006. It presents a somewhat unusual claim by the "other woman" that her boss and object of her desires violated her rights by firing her when his wife objected to her continued employment.

The plaintiff Maelynn Tenge started with the defendant Phillips Modern Ag Co., as a clerical employee. Over the years she worked her way up to a position of responsibility and became a key employee. Scott Phillips was the President of the company, and his wife Lori Phillips worked there, too.

There was no evidence that Tenge and Scott Phillips were having an affair. However, there was plenty of evidence of mutual attraction, including consensual touching. And Tenge admitted to authoring a series of explicit love notes to Scott and leaving them where they could be read by others. When Lori found out, her reaction was predictable. She told Scott to choose between her and the kids on the one hand, or Tenge on the other. Scott chose his family and Tenge was fired.

Tenge sued for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. Affirming the trial court, the 8th Circuit rejected her contention that she was fired because of her sex. The court held that defendants' decision to fire her

does not amount to discrimination on the basis of the employee's status as a man or a woman; rather, it is based on the employee's own actions and therefore is permissible under Title VII. The ultimate basis for Tenge's dismissal was not her sex, it was Scott's desire to allay his wife's concerns over Tenge's admitted sexual behavior with him.

The court was careful to distinguish this case from quid pro quo sexual harassment, where the supervisor's conduct is not welcomed, and from situations where there is demonstrated widespread favoritism for one gender or the other.

Posted In Gender Discrimination & Sexual Harassment , Title VII | Comments (0) | Permalink |

What do you get when you cross a peeping tom manager with a persistent rash? If you're Jill Cottrill and Mary Combs, you get thrown unceremoniously out of court, that's what.

Unfortunately, Cottrill and Combs had to sue in federal court in Missouri. It's unlikely that they would have fared so poorly if they had sued in New Jersey, but their story is instructive nonetheless.

The case is Cottrill v. MFA, Inc. It was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit on April 7, 2006. Over a blunt and well-reasoned dissent, the court upheld the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer.

Jill Cottrill was employed by MFA as a bookkeeper and Mary Combs as a part-time bookkeeper. They were supervised by Scott Adkins, the manager of MFA's retail facility in Albany, Missouri. The facility had one women's restroom, which adjoined a room that Adkins used as his personal "breakroom." Adkins remodeled the restroom in 1997 and added some non-standard equipment to enable him to view Cottrill while she used the restroom: a two-way mirror and a peephole that went through restroom wall into his breakroom. On the breakroom side Adkins hid the peephole with a bookself and paneling.

When Adkins saw Cottrill go to the restroom, he would retire to the breakroom to spy on her. This happened about two to three times per day over a period of four years, from 1997 to 2001. Adkins's deceptions worked: Cottrill never realized that she was being observed.

From about 2000 to 2002 Cottrill also noticed a sticky substance on the toilet seat a number of times. She suffered rashes on her legs, buttocks, ankles, chest and arms. Initially baffled by what was causing the rashes, she came to believe that they were caused by the sticky substance.

Posted In Gender Discrimination & Sexual Harassment , Title VII | Comments (0) | Permalink |

This is a tale from New York, not New Jersey, but Garden State employers should pay attention.

Bradley Baker was employed by Home Depot. He was a full-time employee who worked 40 hours per week and received full benefits. Through religious instruction that he obtained before getting married, he became more strictly observant of his Baptist faith. He learned that Sunday, the Sabbath, was to be strictly observed as a day of rest. Accordingly, he requested from Home Depot the accommodation that he not be scheduled to work on Sundays. A succession of Home Depot managers and schedulers granted him the accommodation by giving him Sundays off.

Eventually a new manager took over Baker's store, one who was not as sympathetic to Baker's beliefs as her predecessors. She had him scheduled to work on Sundays, but offered him a limited accommodation: he would only be assigned Sunday afternoon shifts so that he could attend church in the morning. Baker explained that his request was based not just on church attendance, but on Biblical mandate: on Sundays, he could not work and be true to his faith.

Neither Baker nor the manager bent; litigation ensued.

In Baker v. Home Depot, decided on April 19, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld Baker's right to pursue his claim. It reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Home Depot and allowed the case to go to trial. The Second Circuit held that getting Sundays off based upon a sincere religious belief that work is prohibited on the Sabbath is an accommodation to which Baker may be entitled. It will now be up to a jury to decide whether Baker's stated belief is sincere and religiously grounded, and whether accommodating his belief will be an undue hardship for Home Depot.

We'll keep you posted if we hear anything more on this one.

Posted In Religious Discrimination , Title VII | Comments (0) | Permalink |