Posted on September 11, 2011
by
Frank Steinberg
It has never been easy for a plaintiff to prove a claim for the tort of intention infliction of emotional distress, especially one arising out of the workplace. Things are not getting any easier for employees. In Ingraham v. Ortho-McnNeill, decided by the Appellate Division of New Jersey Superior Court on August 25, 2011, the court emphaszied that IIED cases that arise in the workplace are analyzed in exactly the same way as IIED cases that arise in non-employment settings. Click here for the full opinion.
The facts that the plaintiff presented in Ingraham were sympathetic. The plaintiff's teenage daughter, a talented, accomplished, and popular girl, died tragically while still in high school. Her mother, of course, was distraught. She kept reminders of her daughter in her cubicle at work, including pictures and a pair of ballet slippers. She talked frequently with co-workers about her daughter, so much so that a year and a half after the fact her colleagues complained to management. While sympathetic to her situation, they felt that they had said all that they could. The situation was affecting workplace performance.
A supervisor spoke with plaintiff. Among other things, he instructed her to remove the pictures and ballet slippers, and (in response to plaintiff's question) to "act [as] if [her daughter] did not exist."
Plaintiff became extremely upset, went to a cardiologist for an angioplasty, and eventually quit. After filing suit, her claim for IIED was the only one of three counts that came before the court for decision.
Among other things, the plaintiff argued that the "power dynamics of the workplace" should lessen her burden of demonstrating that plaintiff's conduct was extreme and outrageous. The court rejected that argument.
The law provides no different standard of proof that applies in the workplace from other places where emotional distress might result. The employer-employee relationship is no more special and conducive to emotional distress than, for example, a doctor-patient relationship, the relationship of a decedent's family to a funeral home, the tense relationship of a precarious tenancy where homes might be lost, or the relationship of a husband and wife in a hostile divorce. Indeed, the workplace has too many personal conflicts and too much behavior that might be perceived as uncivil for the courts to be used as the umpire for all but the most extreme workplace disputes. We have previously said that conduct in the workplace will rarely be so egregious as to give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Griffin, supra, we stated: "Except for the kind of aggravated discriminatory conduct involved in Taylor, 'it is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.'
And so, as far as IIED cases are concerned, the status is quo. The court declined to lower the plaintiff's burden of proof to account for the "power dynamics of the workplace." This seems to have been an attempt by plaintiff to import a similar comment from sexual harassment law.
While the risk to employers from IIED claims has not been increased, neither has it been reduced. While rare, it is possible for an employer to lose an IIED case. For this reason, employers are well-advised to continue to investigate complaints, document problems, and establish and follow sound HR procedures.